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Abstract—Electric grid faults can be the source of catas-
trophic wildfires, particularly in regions with high winds and
low humidity. In short-term operations, electric utilities are left
with few actions to mitigate the risk of wildfires, leading to
use of disruptive measures such as proactive de-energization of
equipment, frequently referred to as public safety power shut-
offs. Decisions of how to operate the grid in situations with
high wildfire risk has significant impacts on customers, who may
lose access to electricity in an attempt to protect them from the
outbreak of fires. This work proposes the optimal power shut-off
problem, an optimization model to support operational decision
making in the context of extreme wildfire risk. Specifically, the
model optimizes the operation of the grid to maximize the amount
of power that can be delivered, while proactively minimizing the
risk of wildfire ignitions by selectively de-energizing components
in the grid. This is the first optimization model to consider
preventive wildfire risk measures and their impact on power
systems reliability at a short-term, operational time-frame. The
effectiveness of the method is demonstrated on an augmented
version of the IEEE-RTS GMLC test case, located in Southern
California, and compared against two simpler approaches. We
observe that the optimization-based model reduces both wildfire
risk and lost load shed relative to the benchmarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of tragic wildfires in recent years have highlighted
the loss of life and property that may originate from electric
faults. In Victoria, the 2009 Black Saturday wildfires killed
179 people. Several of those fires, including the most deadly,
were sparked by electric power infrastructures [1]. In Texas,
two 2011 wildfires in Bastrop county started by trees coming
in contact with nearby power lines [2], and became Texas’s
most destructive wildfires in history, killing 4 and causing
more than $300 million in damage. In California, the 2018
Camp Fire killed 84 people, caused an estimated $9.3 billion
in residential property damage alone [3] and ultimately lead
the responsible utility Pacific Gas & Electricity (PG&E) to
file for bankruptcy [4] and accept charges for involuntary
manslaughter [5]. This came only a year after the company’s
equipment started several fires in the 2017 fire season.
The risk of wildfire ignitions by power system infrastructure
is exacerbated by the fact that power failures are more likely
to occur during windy conditions, when wildfires spread faster
and are harder to contain. As a result, research on Australian
bushfires and ignition sources in California has found that fires
ignited by power lines tend to be larger and more damaging
than others [1], [6], [7]. Ignitions caused by power lines are not
uncommon – in Texas, it is estimated that electric equipment
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caused more than 4,000 fires in less than 4 years [8], while
PG&E identified 414 ignition events from 2015-17 [9].
Power infrastructure cause ignitions in a number of ways
[10]–[12], with the most common cause being contact between
vegetation and conductors. Efforts to reduce probability of
ignitions include increased frequency of inspections, more ag-
gressive vegetation management, and changes to the protection
systems to reduce the number of reclosing attempts or limit the
fault current [9], [12]–[14] . However, inspections, vegetation
management, and equipment upgrades must be planned over a
seasonal or yearly time-scale. In a shorter time-frame, utilities
are left with fewer and more disruptive actions to reduce
wildfire risk. Utilities may either limit or turn off automatic
reclosing entirely [9], [13], to ensure that a fault location does
not experience multiple arcing events. However, this does not
mitigate ignitions caused by the initial fault, nor does it avoid
ignitions from high-impedance distribution line faults which
may go undetected [10]. For safety during extreme conditions,
the only measure that completely removes risk of fire ignitions
is therefore to completely turn off a power line, as a de-
energized line will not cause any sparks. After the deadly
and devastating fires caused by electric power lines in 2017
and 2018, California utilities expanded the use of intentional
de-energization of power lines during high-risk conditions to
avoid faults that may spark new fires.
While this is arguably the only way to completely avoid the
risk of ignitions, it also impacts the ability of the power system
to provide reliable electricity. At their peak in October 2019,
the intentional blackouts that result from de-energization, typ-
ically referred to as public power safety shut-offs (PSPS) [9],
[13], turned off power to almost a million customer accounts
[15]. The economic and societal impacts of a blackout on
this scale, lasting for several days, is enormous, and also has
important impacts on health such as increased mortality [16].
After the first major power shut-off in northern California,
PG&E confirmed no less than 100 incidents of wind damage
(including downed lines and contact with trees) along the
25,000 miles of power lines that were taken out of service
[17]. Any of those incidents could have sparked a fire.
Given the stakes, the risk of wildfires versus the disruption
of power outages, it is a challenging, but critically imporant
task to decide which power equipment to turn off. Statements
by PG&E regarding the 2019 Kincade fire, which was likely
ignited by a high-voltage transmission in an area where
all distribution lines were de-energized, indicate that current
operational procedures mostly consider wind speed, wildfire
risk, and voltage levels when deciding which lines to turn
off [18]. This raises the question of whether a more targeted
approach could achieve better results by considering the risk
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2of individual components, and accounting for both the wildfire
risk reduction and the reduction in electric load delivery
associated with turning a specific component off. The need
for less indiscriminate use of public safety power shut-offs
has also been highlighted by the California government [19].
This paper presents a first step towards developing a more
targeted model, and demonstrates that proactively considering
both the risk of wildfires and the impact of a power outages
when optimizing power system operations allows for a better
balance between the two.
Previous work on system operations under wildfire risk is
surprisingly limited. Existing work has focused primarily on
the impact of fires on the operation of power system equip-
ment, such as the risk of wildfire exposure for transmission
lines [20], [21], or operational impacts due to reductions in
the transmission line thermal capacity as a result of heat from
a nearby fire [22], [23]. While the existing work considers the
challenge of operating the grid in presence of fires, this paper
focuses on how power system operators can take an active role
in preventing fires from occurring. Specifically, we provide a
modeling and optimization framework to support the decision
process surrounding a public safety power shut-off, with the
aim of maintaining as much load delivery as possible while
minimizing wildfire risk. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper to describe such a model.
The contributions of our paper are threefold. (1) We review
existing methods for wildfire risk assessment, and extend
those to estimate the relative risk associated with specific
electric components. This allows us to assess the wildfire
risk reduction associated with de-energizing this component.
(2) We propose an optimization framework which minimizes
wildfire risk, while maximizing the amount of load that can
be delivered. This optimization is based on a DC power flow
representation, and uses a risk parameter α to weight the risk
of wildfire vs the willingness to shed load. (3) We compare
our method against two benchmarks on the RTS-GMLC test
case, which was augmented to include data on wildfire risk.
The case study demonstrates the value of accounting for both
wildfire risk and impact on load shedding when determining
which components to de-energize.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes interactions between wildfire risk and electric grid
operation, while Section III provides details on the optimiza-
tion problem formulation. Section IV describes the benchmark
approaches, while Sections V and VI describes the case study
set-up and numerical results. Section VII summarizes and
concludes, and gives an outline of future work.
II. WILDFIRE RISK AND ELECTRIC GRIDS
The main mechanism for fire ignitions by electric power
lines are electric faults, which cause sparks or arcing in a high-
heat release of current [11]. The majority of such ignitions are
caused by vegetation coming into contact with power lines
[9]. This leads to an unfortunate correlation between wild-
fire risk and electric power failures. Extreme fire conditions
are characterized by access to fuel, low humidity and high
wind conditions. Examples of highly flammable fuels include
grasslands, bushes or dead trees [24]. Low humidity leads to a
high probability that an ignition will lead to a fire, particularly
in regions with fire-prone vegetation. High wind conditions
imply that fires spread faster and are harder to contain. At the
same time, high wind conditions cause increased movements
of power lines and nearby trees, and hence increase the
probability of power line faults and subsequent ignitions. This
correlation between decreased ability to contain a fire and
increased probability of ignitions from power grid infrastruc-
ture is what motivates the use of proactive de-energization
of equipment as a preventive, though disruptive measure. In
the following, we first present our model for the wildfire
risk associated with electric components, which allows us to
quantify the risk reduction achieved through equipment de-
energization. We then discuss the trade-off between reducing
the risk and maintaining electric load delivery.
A. Modelling Risk of Wildfire Ignitions
Modelling wildfire risk and its relationship with the op-
eration of electric power system is highly challenging. We
therefore start with a review of the wildfire risk literature,
where we have identified four main components to wildfire
risk.
(i) Probability of an ignition. Ignitions are the initiating
event for a fire and are a localized effect that happen
within a given area. There may be ignitions from several
sources, with ignition probabilities from different sources
varying over the course of the year [7], [25].
(ii) Probability that an ignition leads to a fire. The
probability that an ignition grows to become a (large)
fire is dependent on the immediate local vegetation,
humidity and topology. Measures such as the so-called
fire potential index captures the susceptibility of an
area to an ignition [26], while the large fire probability
captures how likely it is that a small fire of 1 acre would
grow beyond 100 acres in size [27].
(iii) The size and intensity of the resulting fire. The size
and intensity of the fire is also determined by local
vegetation, humidity, topology and weather conditions.
This is referred to as fire behavior, and can be modelled
using simulation tools such as FlamMap [28]
(iv) Damage caused by the fire. The damage caused by a
fire is related to the value of resources inside the area,
as well as the fire intensity. While large scale, high-
intensity fires are typically associated with substantial
damage to property and resources, and therefore have a
high negative impact, (low-intensity) fires are a natural
and necessary component in many ecosystems and may
also have a positive impact [29].
1) Traditional Wildfire Risk Assessment: Traditional as-
sessments of wildfire risk capture these four aspects to a
varying degree. For example, the likelihood that a given area
experiences a fire incorporates both (i) and (ii), and can be
combined with studies of the fire intensity (iii) to determine
the so-called wildfire threat [30]. Wildfire threat data is often
provided at a pre-defined granularity, with areas ranging in
size from 30 by 30 meters [31] to 1 square kilometer [26].
3Examples of wildfire risk maps that consider wildfire threat
include California Fire and Resource Assessment Program’s
Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ) [32], where the threat level
is reported on a scale from 1 to 5 to show the relative risk
in various regions. The United States Forest Service releases
the Wildfire Hazard Potential [33] with relative values ranging
from low to high. The Texas Wildfire Risk Assessment System
(TWRAS) [31], [34] combines assessments of wildfire threat
with information about the damage incurred by a fire through
the so-called Wildland-Urban Interface Response Index which
reports the net impact on housing resources based on wildfire
intensity in a region. The response index is a net value change
on the resources, ranging from -1 (least negative impact) to -9
(most negative impact).
It important to note that all these sources present wildfire
risk at an approximate, relative scale, showing regions that
have a greatly elevated fire potential, wildfire threat or where
significant resources are at risk of fire damage. The scale
is used to aid forest managers, fire departments and local
governments in how to effectively respond to a wildfire
threat through, e.g., prescribed burns or strategic positioning
of fire fighting resources [34]. Thus, existing wildfire risk
assessments are comprehensive and well designed for long
term fire risk planning which reduces the probability that
a fire develops and limit the size and intensity of a fire.
However, because these existing assessment tools frequently
only implicitly account for ignition sources, they must be
adapted to assess the wildfire risk mitigation achieved by
reducing the probability of ignitions from, e.g., electric grid
infrastructure.
2) Wildfire Risk of Electric Components: Considering the
four components of wildfire risk (i) - (iv), we observe that the
only component that can be controlled by the electric utility
(at least at a shorter time-frame) is the probability of ignition
events (i). We therefore discuss our approach to model the
impact of a reduction in the ignition probability.
Assume that we are provided a wildfire map with pre-
defined areas j, where each area is associated with a wildfire
risk value Rj . This value may be, e.g., the wildfire threat [30],
[32], [33] or include information about values at risk of fire
damage [31].
Next, we make an assumption about the ignition sources.
While there are many different sources of ignitions, it is known
that electric power infrastructure are more likely to fail during
certain weather conditions and are the most likely cause of
fires during certain parts of the year [25]. For the purposes
of our analysis, we therefore assume that high-voltage electric
power equipment represent the dominant source of ignitions
in their immediate vicinity (i.e., in the area where they are
located) and are responsible for the full wildfire risk Rj .
However, the probability of an ignition from electric power
equipment in a given area is directly related to operational
decisions such as de-energization (which brings this probabil-
ity to zero), and is also impacted by equipment characteristics
such as the voltage level of power lines, maintenance status
or recent vegetation management. For example, if a line has
a higher fault rate than average or maintenance is overdue,
the ignition rate can be increased. Similarly, lower voltage
transmission lines have a narrower right-of-way, and are
more likely to have vegetation blown into them by strong
winds. Thus, the relative ignition rate of lower voltage lines
may be set higher, particularly if vegetation management
is lagging behind. This leads to relative variations in the
ignition probabilities for different parts of the power systems,
which are not accounted for in the standard wildfire risk
assessments provided by government agencies as they are only
known to the grid operator. We assume that the grid operator
utilizes this information to enhance the wildfire risk model by
incorporating a relative risk factor κe,j , which can be used
to represent an elevated or reduced risk of ignitions from the
electric component e in area j. This gives rise to the following
risk model for the risk Re,j ,
Re,j = κe,jRj . (1)
Here, κ = 1.0 is used as a baseline value for the probability
of ignitions, while κ > 1.0 and κ < 1.0 indicate elevated or
reduced probability, respectively. For components that stretch
across multiple areas j ∈ Ae, the total risk is the cumulative
risk across all areas and is computed by taking the sum across
all areas,
Re =
∑
j∈Ae
κe,jρj . (2)
We note that the risk model (2) does not capture the impact of
a fire that spreads from area j to adjacent areas and thus is only
a local measure of wildfire risk. However, we believe this is a
reasonable model as the electric utility bears responsibility for
avoiding wildfires in the vicinity of their equipment, but does
not have control over mitigation measures to limit the spread
once a fire is ignited such as large scale fuel management or
dispatch of fire fighting services.
3) Short-Term Mitigation of Wildfire Risk: While long-term
planning to reduce wildfire risk include measures such as in-
creased inspections or more aggressive vegetation management
around power lines, these mitigation measures take time to
plan for and implement. In short-term operations, operators
therefore have fewer options, with the most effective (and most
disruptive) being de-energization of equipment. If a component
is de-energized, κe,j is reduced to zero, as there will not be any
faults. The decision on whether to keep a component energized
can hence be understood as a decision related to whether or not
we are willing to accept the risk Re. With this consideration,
we express as
Re =
{ ∑
j∈Ae κe,jRj if e is energized
0 if e is de-energized
(3)
For generators, lines, and buses, we represent the decision
of whether or not to de-energize the equipment through binary
decision variables z∗ ∈ {0, 1} that indicate whether a certain
component is energized or not, with zg, zl, and zi denoting the
variables for generators, lines, and buses, respectively. In the
case of loads, we assume that the load seen by the operator
is representative of a large number of individual loads. We
therefore model load shedding as a continuous variable xd ∈
[0, 1] that represent the fraction of the load (and corresponding
distribution infrastructure) that is de-energized.
4This allows us to model RFire, the total wildfire risk arising
from electric components, as
RFire =
∑
d∈D
xdRd +
∑
g∈G
zgRg +
∑
l∈L
zlRl +
∑
i∈B
ziRi. (4)
where D,G,L, and B represent the sets of load demand,
generators, transmission lines, and buses, respectively. We note
that the units of wildfire risk will be determined by the units
of wildfire risk map we are using. Since these maps are often
represented in an approximate, relative scale (such as low or
high), the risk of the electric components would be ranked on
a similarly coarse scale.
B. Modelling Risk of Power Shut-Offs
De-energizing loads and electric equipment not only reduces
wildfire risk, but also limits the ability of the system to provide
electricity to customers, leading to power shut-offs. It is very
hard to obtain detailed and accurate estimates of the economic
and societal impact of such power shut-offs. The cost depends
on a number of factors, including the frequency and duration
of such shut-offs, as well as the value the electricity provides to
individual customers. We thus refrain from a detailed monetary
assessment of the economic impact of lost load, and aim to
deliver as much load as possible. Our variable DTot represents
the total amount of load delivered, and is expressed by
DTot =
∑
d∈D
xdwdDd, (5)
whereDd is the amount of load served under normal operating
conditions. We include the weight wd to express that certain
loads, such as hospitals or other essential services, may be
prioritized over others.
C. Trading off Risk of Wildfires and Power Shut-Offs
With the above modelling, we express the trade-off between
maximizing load delivery and minimizing wildfire risk as
max (1−α)DTot −αRFire (6)
Here, the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] expresses the trade-off between
serving more load (low α) and avoiding wildfire risk (high α).
We note that although the approximations of the wildfire
risk associated with each component may seem crude and
potentially very conservative, the absolute risk values in the
above model are less important than the relative differences in
risk among different electric grid components. Furthermore,
by solving the model for different values of α, we obtain
a Pareto front of solutions that represent optimal trade-offs
between continued load delivery and reductions in wildfire
risk. Because we solve the Pareto front for all possible values
of α, the units of lost load and wildfire risk do not need to
be the same. We do not prescribe a single optimal solution to
the tradeoff, but rather provide a range of possible solutions
for the operator to choose from based on their preference.
III. OPTIMAL POWER SHUT-OFFS
Based on the above modelling, we now present the opti-
mal power shut-off problem, an optimization framework to
aid decisions related to public power safety shut-offs. We
approach the optimization problem from the perspective of a
power system operator, whose main objective is to maximize
load delivery while minimizing wildfire risk as expressed by
(6). The time frame of this decision is making short-term
operations, ranging from a few days ahead of real-time until
intraday operation. The decision variables are zg, zl, zi and
xd, representing whether or not individual components will
remain energized or not, as well as the power generation of
the generators PGg , g ∈ G, the power flows on transmission
lines l ∈ L from bus j to bus i given by PLl,i,j and the voltage
angles θi, i ∈ B. In the following, we present the constraints
of our model, and summarize the full optimization problem.
1) Component interactions: Generators, loads and lines can
only be energized if the buses they are connected to are
energized. We enforce this through the following constraints,
zi ≥ xd ∀d ∈ BDi , ∀i ∈ B (7a)
zi ≥ zg ∀g ∈ BGi , ∀i ∈ B (7b)
zi ≥ zl ∀l ∈ BLi , ∀i ∈ B (7c)
The sets BDi , BGi , and BLi represent the set of loads, generators,
and lines connected to bus i, respectively.
2) Generators: The generator limits are given by
zgP g ≤ PGg ≤ zgP g ∀g ∈ G (8)
which enforces that Pg = 0 if the generator is turned off,
and otherwise enforces the maximum and minimum generation
limits denoted by P g,P g .
3) Power flow representation and transmission limits: To
represent the power flow in the system, we utilize a DC
power flow representation, extended to model the on/off status
of loads, generators, lines or buses. This gives rise to the
following set of equations,
PLl,i,j ≤ −bl(θi − θj + θmax(1− zl)) ∀l ∈ BLi,j (9a)
PLl,i,j ≥ −bl(θi − θj + θmin(1− zl)) ∀l ∈ BLi,j (9b)
− Tlzl ≤ PLl,i,j ≤ Tlzl ∀l ∈ L (9c)∑
g∈BGi
PGg +
∑
l∈BLi
PLl,i,j −
∑
d∈BDi
xdDd = 0 ∀i ∈ B (9d)
Eqs. (9a)-(9c) represent the power flow Pl,i,j on line l from
bus i to bus j, with bl representing the susceptance of the
line. We note that if line l is energized, i.e. zl = 1, (9a) and
(9b) correspond to the standard DC power flow constraint,
and the power flow is limited to be within the thermal power
flow limit Tl by (9c). If the line is de-energized, zl = 0, we
relax (9a), (9b) by adding constants θmax,θMin to the angle
differences, such that these constraints can never be binding.
Further, for zl = 0, (9c) the power flow Pl,i,j is set to zero. The
nodal power balance is represented in equation (9d), where the
variable xd represents the fraction of the load Dd that is shed.
54) Optimal Power Shut-Off Problem: With the above mod-
eling considerations, the full optimization problem is given by
max
x,z,PG,PL,θ
DTot,RFire
(1−α)DTot −αRFire (6)
s.t.: Component relationship: (7) (OPS)
Generator constraints: (8)
Power flow constraints: (9)
We note that this is a mixed-integer linear program (MILP),
with integer variables for all components in the system.
IV. BENCHMARK METHODS
We compare the optimal power shut-off (10) problem
against two heuristics which decide which components to de-
energize based solely on the associated wildfire risk Re. This
is inspired by accounts of the public safety power shut-offs
in the area around the Kincade fire [18]. These heuristics
are implemented as a two-step procedure, where the first step
decides which components to turn off by checking the wildfire
risk level associated with the components against a pre-defined
threshold and the second step maximizes the amount of load
that can be served given that the high-risk components have
been turned off.
A. Step 1: Component shut-off
We consider two heuristics which differ in the way the
wildfire risk threshold is implemented.
1) Area Heuristic (AH) The first benchmark computes the
overall wildfire risk RA within a predefined area of the electric
grid. If the total risk is above a given threshold RmaxA , all
components within this area are shut off.
Area criterion: RA =
∑
e∈ARe ≥ RmaxA
2) Transmission Heuristic (TH) The second benchmark con-
siders the risk Re of individual transmission lines. If a line
exceeds the pre-fixed risk threshold Rmaxe , it is deactivated.
Transmission criterion: Rl ≥ Rmaxl
In this model, we do not directly shut down loads, generators
or buses, except when they have to be shut down due to lack
of interconnection.
For both of these heuristics, we refer to the set of components
c that should be de-energized as c ∈ C.
B. Step 2: Maximize Load Delivery
After we have identified which loads that need to be
switched off, we solve a version of the maximum load delivery
(MLD) problem. This problem formulation was developed to
identify the largest load delivery in a situation with large-scale
N-k outages [35]. When a significant number of components
are out of service, the network may contain several islands,
some of which may not be able to serve the full load or
may have load that is below the minimum generation limit
of the generators. As a result, a normal optimal power flow
problem may be infeasible, and it is necessary to include
variables to allow further components to be disabled, such
as isolated generators or additional load shed. This gives rise
to the following optimization problem,
max
x,z,PG,PL,
θ,DTot
DTot (5)
s.t.: zc = 0 ∀c ∈ C (MLD)
Component relationship: (7)
Generator constraints: (8)
Power flow constraints: (9)
This problem is identical to the OPS problem (10), except
for a different objective function and constraints requiring
some components to be disabled. The objective function
does not consider wildfire risk, and only maximizes the load
served (corresponding to α = 0 in the OPS problem). Each
component c ∈ C that is disabled by the heuristic has the
corresponding energized binary variable zc constrained to 0
(de-energized). The remaining constraints are the same as in
the OPS problem (10).
After we solve the MLD problem, a final post-processing
step is used to identify and disable network islands that have
no attached load, typically buses that are not connected to
either loads, generators or transmission lines.
We note a few important differences between these heuris-
tics and the OPS model. First, neither of these heuristics
considers how turning off the components impacts the ability
of the system to serve the load. The decisions on which
components are turned on or off are taken solely based on
wildfire risk, without consideration of how much load will be
shed as a result. Second, the optimization problem (11) does
not consider wildfire risk at all. As a result, some components
might be left energized, even if they are not needed to serve
the system load. This unnecessarily increases wildfire risk.
In contrast, the OPS model integrates the two steps into one
optimization problem. It is therefore possible to consider the
mutual relationship between wildfire risk reduction and load
shed achieved by shutting off certain lines.
V. CASE STUDY: IMPLEMENTATION AND SETUP
A. Implementation
The Optimal Power-Shutoff Problem and the accompanying
heuristics are implemented in the Julia programming language
[36] using JuMP [37], and is part of a new package Power-
SystemWildfireRisk.jl which we plan to release in conjunction
with this paper. This package also relies heavily on the
PowerModels.jl packages [38]. The network plots are gen-
erated using a modified version of PowerModelsAnalytics.jl.
The maximum load delivery problem [35] is solved using
PowerModelsRestoration.jl.
Both the optimal power shut-off (10) problem and the
maximum load delivery (MLD) problem used for the heuristics
are mixed-integer linear programs. These problems were all
solved in Julia v1.4 using the Gurobi v8.1 optimizer [39] on a
machine with a 12-thread Intel CPU @3.2 GHz and 16 GB of
memory. With this setup, the optimal power shut-off problem
solves in < 0.5s, while the maximum load delivery problem
solves in < 0.05s.
6Fig. 1: Wildfire Risk Map Power grid test case plotted over a
representative wildfire risk map for Southern California, based loosely
on data in [42].
B. System model with wildfire risk
To create a case study of system with high wildfire risk, we
start with the RTS-GMLC 96-bus case [40]. For our base case
grid, we utilize the standard system configuration as given
in the MatPower case file, but omit the HVDC line. The
values for θmax and θmin are the maximum possible angle
differences that could appear between any two nodes in the
system, calculated as described in [41].
The RTS-GMLC system is provided with geographic co-
ordinates and is located in southern California, Nevada, and
western Arizona as shown on the map in Fig. 1. To associate
this test case with realistic values for wildfire risk, we created
an artificial wildfire risk map, inspired by a map for Southern
California from October 2019 [42]. This map is drawn under-
neath the power lines in Fig. 1. The wildfire risk levels include
low risk (white), medium risk (yellow), high risk (orange), and
extreme risk (dark orange). The western region of the map has
a very high risk, while there is also a region with moderate
wildfire risk at the border to Arizona.
We consider the low risk regions to be business-as-usual
with wildfire risk ρj = 0.0, and assign wildfire risk values ρj
of 1.0, 2.0 and 4.0 for the medium, high, and extreme risk
zones. These risk values are then associated with the power
system components and their assumed fault probabilities to
present the risk of these devices igniting a wildfire.
We assume for simplicity that all generators and buses
(i.e., substations) have the same probability κe,j of starting
an ignition. Since we are mostly concerned about the relative
risk between different components, we assume for simplicity
that κe,j = 1. For the buses and generators, the wildfire risk
coefficient is determined by their locations on the risk map,
e.g. bus i in the extreme risk zone j with wildfire risk ρj = 4.0
has a component risk given by Ri = κi,jρj = 4.0. For
the loads, we may consider assigning a higher probability of
ignition to a larger load (as a large load is indicative of a larger
distribution system). However, other factors than the load size,
such as whether a load represents an urban distribution grid
with mostly underground cables or a rural community with
long high-risk lines, also play a major role in the ignition
probability and is not given as part of the available data. For
simplicity, we therefore assume κd,j = 1 (i.e., the ignition
probability is assumed to be similar to the generators and
buses). As an example, a load in a high risk area with ρj = 2.0
has a component risk of Rd = κd,jρj = 2.0. Further, we set
the weights wd = 1 for all loads.
For transmission lines, we assume that the probability of
ignition is influenced both by the voltage level and the length
of the lines. We assume that the probability of ignition κl,j is
uniform along the lines, and that each 10km segment of the
line counts as an area j with corresponding wildfire risk ρj .
We choose κl,j = 1.0 for the 230 kV lines and κl,j = 2.0 for
the 138 kV lines, indicating that the lower voltage lines have
a higher probability of ignitions relative to the high voltage
lines. We then calculate the component risk Re using (2).
VI. CASE STUDY: NUMERICAL RESULTS
Using the test case presented above, we now assess the
benefit of optimizing the public safety power shut-off under
consideration of both wildfire risk and resulting load shedding.
To do this, we solve the case study problem using both the op-
timized power shut-off (OPS) method, the area heuristic (AH)
and the transmission heuristic (TH). For each of those models
we need to choose some important problem parameters.
For the optimal power shut-off, we need to choose α,
which determines the trade-off between wildfire risk and load
delivery. Choosing an optimal value for α may be possible
if we can quantify the economic and societal impact of both
wildfires and power blackouts. However, since it is notoriously
difficult to obtain accurate estimates of those numbers, we
instead run a parameter sweep where we solve the problem
for multiple values of α to obtain a Pareto curve. Specifically,
we solve the OPS problem with values of alpha ranging from 0
to 1 in steps of 0.01. A grid operator may select any operating
point on this curve depending on their wildfire risk tolerance.
For the transmission heuristic, we need to select a threshold
risk value Rmaxl beyond which we choose to shut off the line.
To determine good choices of Rmaxl , we solve the problem
with values for Rmaxl ranging between 70 (higher than the
highest risk line) and 0 in steps of 1.
For the area heuristic, the RTS-GMLC case has three prede-
fined regions. We select a risk threshold that disables devices
in the high-risk region in the west (corresponding to region 3
in the RTS-GMLC network). We also compare our results with
just maintaining standard operation, where all components are
operational and all load is served.
A. Pareto Front
To compare the results, we first look at the trade-off between
load delivery and wildfire risk obtained with the optimal power
shut-off, the transmission heuristic and the area heuristic. Fig.
2 (a) shows the Pareto front obtained for the optimal power
shut-off with varying values of α (blue), the transmission
heuristic with varying risk thresholds Rmaxl (orange), as well
as the operating point of the area heuristic, which is only a
single point (green). From the Pareto front, we observe that a
significant reduction in risk can be achieved with no, or very
little, load shedding, both with the optimal power shut-off and
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trade-off curve for all methods.
(b) Wildfire risk and load delivery as
a function of α for the optimal power
shut-off.
(c) Wildfire risk and load delivery as
a function of the threshold Rmaxl for
the transmission heuristic.
Fig. 2: Plot (a): Trade-off between load delivery and wildfire risk, as obtained from the optimal power shut-off with different values of α
(blue), the transmission heuristic with different values of Rmaxl (orange) and the area heuristic (green). The stars denote the solutions which
we have selected to analyze further in section VI-B. Plot (b): Wildfire risk and load delivery for the optimal power shut-off as the trade-off
value α changes. Vertical dashed lines correspond to the α of selected solutions. Plot (c): Wildfire risk and load delivery for the transmission
heuristic as the transmission risk threshold Rmaxl is reduced. Vertical dashed lines correspond to the R
max
l of selected solutions.
the transmission heuristic. However, the optimal power shut-
off method consistently achieves a lower risk level for the same
amount of load delivery. The area heuristic performs much
poorer than the other two methods, resulting in both higher
load shed and higher wildfire risk. To illustrate more explicitly
how the solution is impacted by our choice of α and Rmaxl ,
Fig. 2 (b) and (c) show the wildfire risk and load delivery
as a function of the trade-off parameter α (for the optimal
power shut-off) and the wildfire risk threshold Rmaxl (for the
transmission heuristic). In Fig. 2 (b), the optimal power shut-
off shows a sharp drop in risk with a small value of alpha,
while the decrease in load delivery is quite small. When α
reaches 0.25, the risk is very low (but non-zero) and we are
still able to serve approximately 75% of the system load. As
we continue to decrease α, the delivered load slowly decreases
before it abruptly falls to 0 when α reaches 1.0 (when the
problem turns everything off to eliminate all risk, and as a
result serve no load).
For the Transmission Heuristic in Fig. 2 (c), we see a
slightly different behavior. As the transmission line risk thresh-
old decreases from Rmaxl = 70 to 20, the load delivery
remains relatively constant (and high), while wildfire risk de-
creases to less than half of the original value. For Rmaxl < 20,
both the wildfire risk and the delivered load decrease. With
Rmaxl = 0, all of the system is de-energized and no load is
served.
B. Operation Schemes
In Fig. 2 (a), we select five points for further analysis in
the following sections. The selected solutions are indicated by
a star, and correspond to a medium and a low risk scenario
for the optimal power shut-off and the transmission heuristic,
as well as the solution to the area heuristic. For the optimal
power shut-off and the transmission heuristic, the same points
are indicated by black dashed lines in Fig. 2 (b) and (c),
respectively. The medium risk solutions are selected to have
a comparable level of wildfire risk, while serving most of the
load in the network. These solutions have parameter values of
α = 0.01 and Rmaxl = 18.9 for the optimal power shut-off and
the transmission heuristic, respectively. The low risk solutions
are selected to have ≈ 10% of the risk of the original network
and have parameter values of α = 0.15 and Rmaxl = 0.0021.
The Area Heuristic has a regional threshold of Rmax = 30.0.
For these scenarios, we plot the resulting network topologies,
which are shown in Fig. 3 (b)-(f). Here, inactive components
are shown in gray, while active items are shown in green.
Buses with a light-green color fully satisfy load, those in
orange have partial load shed, while those in red represent
when load is completely shed. The blue nodes represent active
generators, and the attached bus is indicated with a dashed
line. Table I lists the total risk, load served, and solve time for
those grid scenarios.
1) Medium-Risk Operation Schemes: We first compare the
two medium risk scenarios obtained with the optimal power
shut-off and the transmission heuristic. As we observe from
Table I, these two scenarios have a similar wildfire risk level,
but the optimal power shut-off serves more load than the
transmission heuristic. Both cases reduce wildfire risk by
50% relative to standard operation (where all components are
energized), at the expense of a reduction in the delivered load
from 8550 MW in standard operation to 8540 MW for the
optimal power shut-off (10 MW load shed) and 8220 MW for
the transmission heuristic (330 MW load shed). We see that
the optimal power shut-off serve almost the entire load, while
reducing the risk by half.
To better understand the differences between the two solu-
tions, we examine the topologies of the energized grid, which
are seen in Fig. 3 (b) and (c). These figures reveal significant
differences in how load is served. The transmission heuristic
in Fig. 3 (b) primarily disables lines in the high-risk western
region, and isolates some loads, shown in red. The network
in the other regions is almost untouched. In comparison, the
optimal power shut-off in Fig. 3 (c) has only 10 MW of
load shed, and reduces the network to a near-radial, tree-like
structure. To serve the load at minimal risk, more components
in lower risk zones are disabled, but this is done in a way
which allows for almost full load delivery. It is important to
note that the optimal power shut-off removes redundancy in
the system in order to reduce risk, and is therefore no longer
N-1 secure. While losing this redundancy negatively impacts
system reliability, it is preferable to an intentional blackout.
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(a) No shutoff
Transmission Heuristic
(b) Medium risk
Optimal Power-Shutoff
(c) Medium risk
Area Shutoff
(d) Regional Shutdown
Transmission Heuristic
(e) Low risk
Optimal Power-Shutoff
(f) Low risk
Fig. 3: Plot (a): Original three-area network with no power shutoff applied. Plots (b)-(f): System topology of power shutoff solutions for
the medium-risk solutions (top) and low-risk solutions (bottom), with area heuristic (left), transmission heuristic (middle) and optimal power
shut-off (right). Inactive components are shown in gray, while active items are shown in green (transmission lines) and blue (generators).
Green, orange and red color for the buses indicate delivery of all, some or no load.
TABLE I: Total risk and load served for selected operating points
Total Risk Load Served Solve Time
Standard Operation 746.2 8550 MW N/A
Medium wildfire risk
Optimal Power Shutoff 319.5 8540 MW 0.34 sec
Transmission Heuristic 332.8 8220 MW 0.17 sec
Low wildfire risk
Optimal Power Shutoff 58.4 7210 MW 0.33 sec
Transmission Heuristic 70.8 6260 MW 0.08 sec
Area Heuristic 186.1 5700 MW 0.04 sec
2) Low-Risk Operation Schemes: We next examine the two
low-risk solutions obtained with the optimal power shut-off
solutions and the transmission heuristic, respectively. These
low-risk solutions were chosen to have a similar risk level, as
can be seen in Table I. We first observe that relative to the
medium risk case, the wildfire risk is reduced by an order of
magnitude, but at the expense of delivering much less load.
The transmission heuristic delivers only 6260 MW load (cor-
responding to 2290 MW load shed), while the optimal power
shut-off achieves 7210 MW load delivery (corresponding to
1340 MW load shed). We conclude that the optimal power
shut-off reduces load shed by 25% relative to the transmission
heuristic at comparable risk levels.
When examining the system topologies of the low-risk
solutions in Fig. 3 (e) and (f), we observe that both methods
shut down almost all components in the high-risk western
region. Both approaches also choose to island some regions of
the grid, based on the ability of nearby generation to support
the load. The main difference between the two solutions is
that the optimized strategy is able to prioritize shut-off of
components that have a lower impact on load delivery.
We note that the assumption that the grid can operate
in multiple islands may or may not be realistic, depending
on the generators ability to maintain stable operation, and
procedures for resynchronization once the wildfire risk is
less acute. However, this result highlights how geographically
distributed generation can support local load during large-scale
disruptions to the grid.
3) The value of a targeted approach: We next take a closer
look at the three grid topologies shown in the bottom part
of Fig. 3, which from left to right represent an increasingly
targeted approach to public safety power shutdown. Our least
targeted approach is the area heuristic in Fig. 3 (d), which
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solutions obtained with the optimal power shut-off problem.
Optimal Power Shut-Off Total Bus Line Gen. Load
Medium Wildfire Risk 319.5 52.0 181.7 26.0 59.9
Low Wildfire Risk 58.4 15.0 12.6 13.0 17.8
shuts down an entire region based on a simple threshold. The
transmission heuristic in Fig. 3 (e) is more targeted because
it considers the risk values of individual lines. Finally, the
optimal power shut-off in Fig. 3 (f) is the most comprehensive
approach, as it considers both the risk of individual compo-
nents as well as their impact on the system’s ability to serve
the load. Comparing the grid topologies and the values for load
delivery and wildfire risk in Table I, we observe that including
mode detail consistently enables a solution with lower risk and
increased load delivery.
C. Optimal Power Shut-Off Solutions
To better understand the optimal power shut-off solutions,
we investigate how the total risk is distributed among the
different component types. Table II shows the risk is associated
with each component type in the medium and low risk
solutions. The two cases differ mainly in how much wildfire
risk is associated with transmission lines. Transmission lines
contribute 57% of the total risk in the medium-risk case,
compared with only 20% in the low-risk case.
To understand transmission line risk in more detail, we
plot the risk coefficient Rl for each line against the amount
of power carried by this line, PLl,i,j . The result is shown in
Fig. 4, with the medium risk solution on the left and the
low risk solution on the right. The energized transmission
lines are represented by blue dots and de-energized lines are
plotted in orange (note that PLl,i,j = 0 for de-energized lines).
From these plots, we first observe that the risk values of the
lines vary between 0 and 53, with most lines concentrated at
lower values. We notice that the low-risk solution turns off
essentially all high-risk power lines, while the medium risk
solution allows even some of the highest risk lines continue
to operate. Further, we see that the threshold for when the
lines are turned off is not given by the absolute risk value
of the line (as it is in the threshold heuristic), but is rather a
function of both the risk value of the line and the amount of
power transferred by the line. These results demonstrate how
the optimal power shut-off problem allows high risk lines to
operate if they transfer a significant amount of power, and thus
contribute significantly to increase the amount of delivered
load.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work proposes a new optimization model to minimize
wildfire risk due to electric power system components, while
maintaining electricity supply to as many customers as pos-
sible. The first contribution is to devise a principled strategy
to assign risk values to electric components. Specifically, we
propose to utilize extensions of existing models for wildfire
risk to assign risk values to individual electrical components,
but extend those risk values to account for information about
elevated or reduced ignition probability based on component
characteristics. This allows us to assess the reduction in
wildfire risk that is achieved by de-energizing the component.
Our second contribution is to formulate the optimal power
shut-off problem that utilizes these risk values. This problem
is is similar to an optimal power flow with additional decision
variables to represent whether or not a component is energized.
The objective is to minimize wildfire risk, while maximizing
load delivery. This proposed approach is demonstrated on the
RTS-GMLC test case, which is combined with data from a
wildfire risk map. The optimal power shut-off problem is
compared against two heuristic decision models which disable
specific components based on their wildfire risk value alone
(i.e., without consideration of the impact on load shed). We
make the three significant observations:
• The optimal power shut-off problem, which considers
both the wildfire risk value and the impact on the deliv-
ered load, is able to serve more load at lower risk values
compared with the threshold-based heuristic.
• This is achieved by allowing highly loaded lines (which
are important to maintain load delivery) to continue to
operate at higher wildfire risk values, while less loaded
lines are shut-off at lower risk values.
• The minimal risk network topology has a tree-like struc-
ture, and the system is sometimes split into islands.
Given those observations, we consider our model as a first,
important step to better understand how power system oper-
ations can be modified to minimize wildfire risk, at minimal
disruption to customers.
However, there are also a large number of important avenues
for future work. We believe that it is important to better
understand how the probability of wildfire ignitions from
power system equipment change based on external conditions,
such as local weather conditions and landscape characteristics,
and conditions we can control, such as vegetation management
or maintenance schedule. This would enable a more detailed,
time-dependent calculation of the component wildfire risk.
This time-dependent model for wildfire risk can be coupled
with time-varying data for electric load and renewable energy
sources such as wind power to identify an optimal network
topology that minimizes the wildfire risk and maximizes load
delivery throughout the day. Choosing a single fixed topology,
rather than constantly re-configuring the network based on
changing risks, is necessary since de-energized lines require
inspection before they can be safely re-energized.
Another important consideration that is currently missing
from our model is considerations related to electric faults
that occur after the power shut-off is already in place. These
faults have significant impact on reliability and expected load
delivery, particularly because high wildfire risk is correlated
with high probability of faults and the system may no longer
be N-1 secure.
Other extensions include consideration of energy storage,
which may impact grid operations by allowing batteries to
buffer energy when a region is temporarily disconnected from
transmission because of wildfire risk, or modelling islanding
capabilities of the grid (e.g. as locally run microgrids) which
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(a) Medium risk operation. (b) Low risk operation.
Fig. 4: Scatter plot showing the wildfire risk (horizontal axis) and the power transferred (vertical axis) for each transmission line.
may allow regions to operate on a combination of local
generation and energy storage systems for short periods of
time. Extensions to account for more detailed distribution grid
modelling are also important, as distribution grid lines are
the source of more ignitions. Finally, a better understanding
of the impact of planning decisions on wildfire risk, such
as improved vegetation management and maintenance sched-
ules, can inform preventative measures for handling wildfire
risk. Integrating potential wildfire risk operation modes into
planning problems for vegetation management, maintenance
schedules, or integration studies may enable improved risk
mitigation strategies which not only avoid wildfires, but also
sustain higher levels of load delivery.
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